
Hindsight Bias



Sidney Dekker, 2009

Overcoming Hindsight Bias

- Assume nobody comes to work to do a bad job.
- Investigation reports should explain
 - Why it made sense for people to do what they did
 - What changes will reduce likelihood of happening again

Widespread Myths about Safety

- Safety requires unacceptable financial and other costs
 - Requires tradeoffs with other organizational goals and unacceptable compromises
 - Can add safety to an unsafe design
 - Safe systems cost more

All myths have some elements of truth

Why are our Efforts Often Not Cost-Effective?

- Efforts superficial, isolated, or misdirected
- Safety efforts start too late
- Inappropriate techniques for systems built today
- Focus efforts only on technical components of system
- Systems assumed to be static through lifetime
- Success can lead to failure (risk perception)
- Limited learning from events

Management

- *Leadership -- Culture -- Behavior
- * Policy
- Safety Management Plan
- Safety Information System

- * Safety Control Structure Responsibility, Accountability, Authority Controls Feedback Channels
- * Continual Improvement

Engineering Development Operations Hazards Safety Requirements/Constraints Operations Safety Management Plan Safety Constraints, Operational Controls Design Rational, Assumptions Operating Requirements, Physical and Assumptions Maintenance Priorities. Usage Change Management. Operational Environment Hazard Analysis Audits/Performance Assessments *Human Task Analysis Problem Reporting System System Operations Analysis Problems, Experience Accident/Incident Causal Analysis Investigation Reports Hazard Analysis and Education and Training Safety-Guided Design Continual Improvement

Hazard

Analysis

Design


Decisions

Where We Are


- New accident causality model based on systems theory
- On this we can create new analysis, design and decision tools
 - Hazard analysis techniques (STPA)
 - Design approaches
 - Accident causality (CAST)
 - Operations
 - Management

SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT

SYSTEM OPERATIONS








System Hazard: Public is exposed to E. coli or other health-related contaminants through drinking water.

System Safety Constraints: The safety control structure must prevent exposure of the public to contaminated water.

- (1) Water quality must not be compromised.
- (2) Public health measures must reduce risk of exposure if water quality is compromised (e.g., notification and procedures to follow)



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Walkerton PUC Operations Management

Safety Requirements and Constraints:

- Monitor operations to ensure that sample taking and reporting is accurate and adequate chlorination is being performed.
- Keep accurate records.
- Update knowledge as required.

Context in Which Decisions Made:

- Complaints by citizens about chlorine taste in drinking water.
- Improper activities were established practice for 20 years.
- Lacked adequate training and expertise.

Inadequate Control Actions:

- Inadequate monitoring and supervision of operations
- Adverse test results not reported when asked.
- Problems discovered during inspections not rectified.
- Inadequate response after first symptoms in community
- Did not maintain proper training or operations records.

Mental Model Flaws:


- Believed sources for water system were generally safe.
- Thought untreated water safe to drink.
- Did not understand health risks posed by underchlorinated water.
- Did not understand risks of bacterial contaminants like E. coli.
- Did not believe guidelines were a high priority.

CAST

- Accident analysis method
- Steps to take
 - Defining hazards and safety control structure
 - Start with physical structure
 - Work upward in structure (may involve adding new parts of safety control structure)
 - Define:
 - Responsibilities
 - Inadequate control actions
 - Context
 - Process model flaws

- Coordination and Communication
- Dynamics and migration to higher risk
- Generating Recommendations

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