## Supply Contracts

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## Outline

$\square$ Supply contracts
$\square$ Wholesale contracts
$\square$ Buyback contracts
$\square$ Revenue sharing contracts
$\square$ Option contracts

## The Scenario:


$\square$ A contract is negotiated
$\square$ The retailer places order (a single period)
-The supplier makes and sends the stuff
$\square$ The selling season takes place
$\square$ Accounting (sales, salvage, etc.)

## Consumer Demand



| Bin | Freq. |
| ---: | ---: |
| 400 | 0 |
| 500 | 2 |
| 600 | 5 |
| 700 | 11 |
| 800 | 15 |
| 900 | 10 |
| 1,000 | 5 |
| 1,100 | 3 |
| 1,200 | 1 |
| 1,300 | 0 |

Average: 811.54 Std Dev: 154.23
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## Demand Distribution

Normal Approximation


## Notations:

| Retail Price | R |
| :--- | :--- |
| Wholesale Price | W |
| Supplier's Cost | C |
| Salvage Value | S |
| Quantity Ordered | Q |
| Actual Retail Demand | d |
| Retail Demand Density | f(D) |
| Retail Cum. Demand Distribution | F(D) |

## Wholesale Contracts

$\square$ Prices and costs:

- Supplier has a cost to make/purchase ( $\mathrm{C}=\$ 50$ )
- Supplier is selling and retail is buying at a wholesale price ( $\mathrm{W}=\$ 135$ )
- Retailer is selling for a retail price $(\mathrm{R}=\$ 200)$
- Retailer can salvage ( $S=\$ 10$ )
$\square$ How do we optimize the retailer's expected profit?
- Retailer is facing a Newsboy problem and supplier's profit is trivial
$\square$ How do we optimize the supplier's expected profit? <br> \title{
Wholesale Price Contract
} <br> \title{
Wholesale Price Contract
}

| Retailer: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Order: | 200 | 300 | 400 | 500 | 600 | 700 | 800 | 900 | 1000 | 1100 | 1200 | 1300 | 1400 | 1500 | 1600 |
| Demand Prob |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $400 \quad 0.00$ | \$13,000 | \$19,500 | \$26,000 | \$13,500 | \$1,000 | -\$11,500 | -\$24,000 | -\$36,500 | -\$49,000 | -\$61,500 | -\$74,000 | -\$86,500 | -\$99,000 | -\$111,500 | -\$124,000 |
| $500 \quad 0.04$ | \$13,000 | \$19,500 | \$26,000 | \$32,500 | \$20,000 | \$7,500 | -\$5,000 | -\$17,500 | -\$30,000 | -\$42,500 | -\$55,000 | -\$67,500 | -\$80,000 | -\$92,500 | -\$105,000 |
| $600 \quad 0.10$ | \$13,000 | \$19,500 | \$26,000 | \$32,500 | \$39,000 | \$26,500 | \$14,000 | \$1,500 | -\$11,000 | -\$23,500 | -\$36,000 | -\$48,500 | -\$61,000 | -\$73,500 | -\$86,000 |
| $700 \quad 0.21$ | \$13,000 | \$19,500 | \$26,000 | \$32,500 | \$39,000 | \$45,500 | \$33,000 | \$20,500 | \$8,000 | -\$4,500 | -\$17,000 | -\$29,500 | -\$42,000 | -\$54,500 | -\$67,000 |
| $800 \quad 0.29$ | \$13,000 | \$19,500 | \$26,000 | \$32,500 | \$39,000 | \$45,500 | \$52,000 | \$39,500 | \$27,000 | \$14,500 | \$2,000 | -\$10,500 | -\$23,000 | -\$35,500 | -\$48,000 |
| $900 \quad 0.19$ | \$13,000 | \$19,500 | \$26,000 | \$32,500 | \$39,000 | \$45,500 | \$52,000 | \$58,500 | \$46,000 | \$33,500 | \$21,000 | \$8,500 | -\$4,000 | -\$16,500 | -\$29,000 |
| 1,000 0.10 | \$13,000 | \$19,500 | \$26,000 | \$32,500 | \$39,000 | \$45,500 | \$52,000 | \$58,500 | \$65,000 | \$52,500 | \$40,000 | \$27,500 | \$15,000 | \$2,500 | -\$10,000 |
| 1,100 0.06 | \$13,000 | \$19,500 | \$26,000 | \$32,500 | \$39,000 | \$45,500 | \$52,000 | \$58,500 | \$65,000 | \$71,500 | \$59,000 | \$46,500 | \$34,000 | \$21,500 | \$9,000 |
| 1,200 0.02 | \$13,000 | \$19,500 | \$26,000 | \$32,500 | \$39,000 | \$45,500 | \$52,000 | \$58,500 | \$65,000 | \$71,500 | \$78,000 | \$65,500 | \$53,000 | \$40,500 | \$28,000 |
| 1,300 0.00 | \$13,000 | \$19,500 | \$26,000 | \$32,500 | \$39,000 | \$45,500 | \$52,000 | \$58,500 | \$65,000 | \$71,500 | \$78,000 | \$84,500 | \$72,000 | \$59,500 | \$47,000 |
| Expected Profit: | \$13,000 | \$19,500 | \$26,000 | \$32,500 | \$38,269 | \$42,212 | \$42,135 | \$36,577 | \$27,365 | \$16,327 | \$4,192 | -\$8,308 | -\$20,808 | -\$33,308 | -\$45,808 |
| Maximum Profit: |  |  |  |  |  | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Supplier:

|  | Order: | 200 | 300 | 400 | 500 | 600 | 700 | 800 | 900 | 1000 | 1100 | 1200 | 1300 | 1400 | 1500 | 1600 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Demand | Prob |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 400 | 0.00 | \$17,000 | \$25,500 | \$34,000 | \$42,500 | \$51,000 | \$59,500 | \$68,000 | \$76,500 | \$85,000 | \$93,500 | \$102,000 | \$110,500 | \$119,000 | \$127,500 | \$136,000 |
| 500 | 0.04 | \$17,000 | \$25,500 | \$34,000 | \$42,500 | \$51,000 | \$59,500 | \$68,000 | \$76,500 | \$85,000 | \$93,500 | \$102,000 | \$110,500 | \$119,000 | \$127,500 | \$136,000 |
| 600 | 0.10 | \$17,000 | \$25,500 | \$34,000 | \$42,500 | \$51,000 | \$59,500 | \$68,000 | \$76,500 | \$85,000 | \$93,500 | \$102,000 | \$110,500 | \$119,000 | \$127,500 | \$136,000 |
| 700 | 0.21 | \$17,000 | \$25,500 | \$34,000 | \$42,500 | \$51,000 | \$59,500 | \$68,000 | \$76,500 | \$85,000 | \$93,500 | \$102,000 | \$110,500 | \$119,000 | \$127,500 | \$136,000 |
| 800 | 0.29 | \$17,000 | \$25,500 | \$34,000 | \$42,500 | \$51,000 | \$59,500 | \$68,000 | \$76,500 | \$85,000 | \$93,500 | \$102,000 | \$110,500 | \$119,000 | \$127,500 | \$136,000 |
| 900 | 0.19 | \$17,000 | \$25,500 | \$34,000 | \$42,500 | \$51,000 | \$59,500 | \$68,000 | \$76,500 | \$85,000 | \$93,500 | \$102,000 | \$110,500 | \$119,000 | \$127,500 | \$136,000 |
| 1,000 | 0.10 | \$17,000 | \$25,500 | \$34,000 | \$42,500 | \$51,000 | \$59,500 | \$68,000 | \$76,500 | \$85,000 | \$93,500 | \$102,000 | \$110,500 | \$119,000 | \$127,500 | \$136,000 |
| 1,100 | 0.06 | \$17,000 | \$25,500 | \$34,000 | \$42,500 | \$51,000 | \$59,500 | \$68,000 | \$76,500 | \$85,000 | \$93,500 | \$102,000 | \$110,500 | \$119,000 | \$127,500 | \$136,000 |
| 1,200 | 0.02 | \$17,000 | \$25,500 | \$34,000 | \$42,500 | \$51,000 | \$59,500 | \$68,000 | \$76,500 | \$85,000 | \$93,500 | \$102,000 | \$110,500 | \$119,000 | \$127,500 | \$136,000 |
| 1,300 | 0.00 | \$17,000 | \$25,500 | \$34,000 | \$42,500 | \$51,000 | \$59,500 | \$68,000 | \$76,500 | \$85,000 | \$93,500 | \$102,000 | \$110,500 | \$119,000 | \$127,500 | \$136,000 |

Expected Profit: $\quad \$ 17,000 \quad \$ 25,500 \quad \$ 34,000 \quad \$ 42,500 \quad \$ 51,000 \quad \$ 59,500 \quad \$ 68,000 \quad \$ 76,500 \quad \$ 85,000 \quad \$ 93,500 \quad \$ 102,000 \quad \$ 110,500 \quad \$ 119,000 \quad \$ 127,500 \quad \$ 136,000$ Maximum Profit:

Total Profit: $\quad \$ 30,000 \quad \$ 45,000 \quad \$ 60,000 \quad \$ 75,000 \quad \$ 89,269 \mathbf{\$ 1 0 1 , 7 1 2} \mathbf{\$ 1 1 0 , 1 3 5} \mathbf{\$ 1 1 3 , 0 7 7} \mathbf{\$ 1 1 2 , 3 6 5} \mathbf{\$ 1 0 9 , 8 2 7} \mathbf{\$ 1 0 6 , 1 9 2} \mathbf{\$ 1 0 2 , 1 9 2} \mathbf{\$ 9 8}, 192 \quad \$ 94,192 \quad \$ 90,192$ Maximum Profit
(c) Yossi Sheffi, MIT

## Wholesale Price Contract Expected Profits


(c) Yossi Sheffi, MIT

## Wholesale Price Contract Exp Profits (Normal Approx)



Optimal Retailer order=
$F^{-1}\left(\frac{R-W}{R-S}\right)=$ NORMINV $\left(\frac{200-135}{200-10}, 811,154\right)=746$

Optimal channel order=
$F^{-1}\left(\frac{R-C}{R-S}\right)=\operatorname{NORMINV}\left(\frac{200-50}{200-10}, 811,154\right)=936$

## Effects of Wholesale Price on Profits



## Optimal Retail Order as a Function of the Wholesale Price



## Wholesale Price Contract

 Coordinating the Channel$$
\begin{gathered}
Q_{\text {Ret tailer }}^{*}=Q_{\text {Channel }}^{*} \\
F^{-1}\left(\frac{R-W}{R-S}\right)=F^{-1}\left(\frac{R-C}{R-S}\right) \\
\left(\frac{R-W}{R-S}\right)=\left(\frac{R-C}{R-S}\right)
\end{gathered}
$$

$$
W=C
$$

## Buyback Contract

$\square$ The problem: how can the supplier convince the retailer to move towards the optimal order size?
$\square$ The supplier offer to the retailer to buy back all unsold items (\$B/item).
$\square$ For the retailer - this is like a higher salvage value, so he will order more.
$\square$ The supplier now shares in the overage risk (he can still salvage, though, at the same price).
$\square \quad$ Note: supplier may simply pay (\$B-\$S) rather than actually buy back (unless he has a better use for it)


| Supplier: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Order: | 200 | 300 | 400 | 500 | 600 | 700 | 800 | 900 | 1000 | 1100 | 1200 | 1300 | 1400 | 1500 | 1600 |
| Demand Prob |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $400 \quad 0.00$ | \$17,000 | \$25,500 | \$34,000 | \$35,500 | \$37,000 | \$38,500 | \$40,000 | \$41,500 | \$43,000 | \$44,500 | \$46,000 | \$47,500 | \$49,000 | \$50,500 | \$52,000 |
| $500 \quad 0.04$ | \$17,000 | \$25,500 | \$34,000 | \$42,500 | \$44,000 | \$45,500 | \$47,000 | \$48,500 | \$50,000 | \$51,500 | \$53,000 | \$54,500 | \$56,000 | \$57,500 | \$59,000 |
| $600 \quad 0.10$ | \$17,000 | \$25,500 | \$34,000 | \$42,500 | \$51,000 | \$52,500 | \$54,000 | \$55,500 | \$57,000 | \$58,500 | \$60,000 | \$61,500 | \$63,000 | \$64,500 | \$66,000 |
| $700 \quad 0.21$ | \$17,000 | \$25,500 | \$34,000 | \$42,500 | \$51,000 | \$59,500 | \$61,000 | \$62,500 | \$64,000 | \$65,500 | \$67,000 | \$68,500 | \$70,000 | \$71,500 | \$73,000 |
| $800 \quad 0.29$ | \$17,000 | \$25,500 | \$34,000 | \$42,500 | \$51,000 | \$59,500 | \$68,000 | \$69,500 | \$71,000 | \$72,500 | \$74,000 | \$75,500 | \$77,000 | \$78,500 | \$80,000 |
| $900 \quad 0.19$ | \$17,000 | \$25,500 | \$34,000 | \$42,500 | \$51,000 | \$59,500 | \$68,000 | \$76,500 | \$78,000 | \$79,500 | \$81,000 | \$82,500 | \$84,000 | \$85,500 | \$87,000 |
| 1,000 0.10 | \$17,000 | \$25,500 | \$34,000 | \$42,500 | \$51,000 | \$59,500 | \$68,000 | \$76,500 | \$85,000 | \$86,500 | \$88,000 | \$89,500 | \$91,000 | \$92,500 | \$94,000 |
| 1,100 0.06 | \$17,000 | \$25,500 | \$34,000 | \$42,500 | \$51,000 | \$59,500 | \$68,000 | \$76,500 | \$85,000 | \$93,500 | \$95,000 | \$96,500 | \$98,000 | \$99,500 | \$101,000 |
| 1,200 0.02 | \$17,000 | \$25,500 | \$34,000 | \$42,500 | \$51,000 | \$59,500 | \$68,000 | \$76,500 | \$85,000 | \$93,500 | \$102,000 | \$103,500 | \$105,000 | \$106,500 | \$108,000 |
| 1,300 0.00 | \$17,000 | \$25,500 | \$34,000 | \$42,500 | \$51,000 | \$59,500 | \$68,000 | \$76,500 | \$85,000 | \$93,500 | \$102,000 | \$110,500 | \$112,000 | \$113,500 | \$115,000 |
| Expected Profit: | \$17,000 | \$25,500 | \$34,000 | \$42,500 | \$50,731 | \$58,288 | \$64,365 | \$68,423 | \$71,135 | \$73,173 | \$74,808 | \$76,308 | \$77,808 | \$79,308 | \$80,808 |
| Maximum Profit: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | !!! |
| Total Profit: | \$30,000 | \$45,000 | \$60,000 | \$75,000 | \$89,269 | \$101,712 | \$110,135 | \$113,077 | \$112,365 | \$109,827 | \$106,192 | \$102,192 | \$98,192 | \$94,192 | \$90,192 |
| Maximum Profit |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | !!! |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

## Channel profit with Buyback



## Optimal Buyback and Wholesale price

$\square$ Higher wholesale price requires a higher buyback rate.
$\square$ As the wholesale price (and the buyback rate) grows the supplier's share of the profit increases.

- Wholesale price ranges from $\$ 50$ (supplier's cost) to \$200 (retail price)
- Buyback rate ranges from $\$ 10$ (salvage value) to the wholesale price.


## Expected Profits with Buyback Contract

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \mathrm{R}=\$ 200 \\
& \mathrm{~W}=\$ 135 \\
& \mathrm{C}=\$ 50 \\
& \mathrm{~S}=\$ 10 \\
& \mathrm{~B}=\$ 80
\end{aligned}
$$



## Optimal Buyback Price

$$
Q_{\text {Retailer }}^{*}=Q_{\text {Channel }}^{*}
$$

The manufacturer's levers are the wholesale price and the buyback rate

$$
\begin{gathered}
F^{-1}\left(\frac{R-W}{R-B}\right)=F^{-1}\left(\frac{R-C}{R-S}\right) \\
\left(\frac{R-W}{R-B}\right)=\left(\frac{R-C}{R-S}\right) \\
B=\left(\frac{R-S}{R-C}\right) W-\left(\frac{R(C-S)}{R-C}\right)
\end{gathered}
$$

## Channel Coordination with Buyback

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \mathrm{R}=\$ 200 \\
& \mathrm{~W}= \\
& \mathrm{C}=\$ 50 \\
& \mathrm{~S}=\$ 10 \\
& \mathrm{~B}=
\end{aligned}
$$

Wholesale Price \& Buyback Amount that


## Expected Profit with Coordinating Buyback Rate

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \mathrm{R}=\$ 200 \\
& \mathrm{~W}=\$ 135 \\
& \mathrm{C}=\$ 50 \\
& \mathrm{~S}=\$ 10 \\
& \mathbf{B}^{*}=\$ \mathbf{1 1 8}
\end{aligned}
$$


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## Buyback Contracts in Practice

$\square$ Book publishing
$\square$ Periodicals/newspapers
$\square$ Price support in consumer electronics

## Revenue Sharing

$\square$ Supplier still needs to get the retailer to order more
$\square$ Another risk-sharing scheme: supplier lowers the wholesale price but takes a percentage (1-p) of the revenue
$\square$ Question: how to choose $W$ and $p$ so the retailer will order the optimal amount
$\square$ Note: wholesale price has to be lower than the supplier's cost.

## The Players

Images of the Paramount motion picture company and the Blockbuster video rental chain removed due to copyright restrictions.

## The Economics of Revenue Sharing

In the video industry, revenue sharing may increase profits for the supplier and the retailer alike, as this hypothetical example reveals.

## FOR THE RETAILER

|  | Traditional Pricing | Revenue Sharing |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| A. Number of tapes purchased | 10 | 30 |
| B. Price per tape | $\$ 60$ | $\$ 9$ |
| C. Purchase cost | $\$ 600$ | $\$ 270$ |
| D. Number of rentals | 300 | 500 |
| E. Total rental revenue (D x $\$ 3 /$ rental $)$ | $\$ 900$ | $\$ 1,500$ |
| F. Retailer's share of rental revenue | $\$ 900(100 \%)$ | $\$ 750(50 \%)$ |
| G. Retailer's profit | $\$ 300$ | $\$ 480$ |
| H. Profit per dollar of inventory | $\$ 0.50$ | $\$ 1.78$ |
| FOR THE SUPPLIER |  |  |


|  | Traditional Pricing | Revenue Sharing |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| I. Number of tapes purchased | 10 | 30 |
| J. Price per tape | $\$ 60$ | $\$ 9$ |
| K. Revenue from selling tapes | $\$ 600$ | $\$ 270$ |
| L. Number of rentals | 300 | 500 |
| M. Total rental revenue (L x $\$ 3 /$ rental) | $\$ 900$ | $\$ 1,500$ |
| N. Supplier's share of rental revenue | $\$ 0(0 \%)$ | $\$ 750(50 \%)$ |
| O. Supplier's total revenues | $\$ 600$ | $\$ 1,020$ |
| P. Supplier's production and distribution cost (Ix \$10/tape) | $\$ 100$ | $\$ 300$ |
| Q. Supplier's profit | $\$ 500$ | $\$ 720$ |

# Revenue Sharing 

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Retailer: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Order: | 200 | 300 | 400 | 500 | 600 | 700 | 800 | 900 | 1000 | 1100 | 1200 | 1300 | 1400 | 1500 | 1600 |
| Demand Prob |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $400 \quad 0.00$ | \$8,000 | \$12,000 | \$16,000 | \$13,000 | \$10,000 | \$7,000 | \$4,000 | \$1,000 | -\$2,000 | -\$5,000 | -\$8,000 | -\$11,000 | -\$14,000 | -\$17,000 | -\$20,000 |
| $500-0.04$ | \$8,000 | \$12,000 | \$16,000 | \$20,000 | \$17,000 | \$14,000 | \$11,000 | \$8,000 | \$5,000 | \$2,000 | -\$1,000 | -\$4,000 | -\$7,000 | -\$10,000 | -\$13,000 |
| $600 \quad 0.10$ | \$8,000 | \$12,000 | \$16,000 | \$20,000 | \$24,000 | \$21,000 | \$18,000 | \$15,000 | \$12,000 | \$9,000 | \$6,000 | \$3,000 | \$0 | -\$3,000 | -\$6,000 |
| $700 \quad 0.21$ | \$8,000 | \$12,000 | \$16,000 | \$20,000 | \$24,000 | \$28,000 | \$25,000 | \$22,000 | \$19,000 | \$16,000 | \$13,000 | \$10,000 | \$7,000 | \$4,000 | \$1,000 |
| $800 \quad 0.29$ | \$8,000 | \$12,000 | \$16,000 | \$20,000 | \$24,000 | \$28,000 | \$32,000 | \$29,000 | \$26,000 | \$23,000 | \$20,000 | \$17,000 | \$14,000 | \$11,000 | \$8,000 |
| $900 \quad 0.19$ | \$8,000 | \$12,000 | \$16,000 | \$20,000 | \$24,000 | \$28,000 | \$32,000 | \$36,000 | \$33,000 | \$30,000 | \$27,000 | \$24,000 | \$21,000 | \$18,000 | \$15,000 |
| 1,000 0.10 | \$8,000 | \$12,000 | \$16,000 | \$20,000 | \$24,000 | \$28,000 | \$32,000 | \$36,000 | \$40,000 | \$37,000 | \$34,000 | \$31,000 | \$28,000 | \$25,000 | \$22,000 |
| 1,100 0.06 | \$8,000 | \$12,000 | \$16,000 | \$20,000 | \$24,000 | \$28,000 | \$32,000 | \$36,000 | \$40,000 | \$44,000 | \$41,000 | \$38,000 | \$35,000 | \$32,000 | \$29,000 |
| 1,200 0.02 | \$8,000 | \$12,000 | \$16,000 | \$20,000 | \$24,000 | \$28,000 | \$32,000 | \$36,000 | \$40,000 | \$44,000 | \$48,000 | \$45,000 | \$42,000 | \$39,000 | \$36,000 |
| 1,300 0.00 | \$8,000 | \$12,000 | \$16,000 | \$20,000 | \$24,000 | \$28,000 | \$32,000 | \$36,000 | \$40,000 | \$44,000 | \$48,000 | \$52,000 | \$49,000 | \$46,000 | \$43,000 |
| Expected Profit: | \$8,000 | \$12,000 | \$16,000 | \$20,000 | \$23,731 | \$26,788 | \$28,365 | \$27,923 | \$26,135 | \$23,673 | \$20,808 | \$17,808 | \$14,808 | \$11,808 | \$8,808 |
| Maximum Profit: |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |


|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Order: <br> Demand <br> Prob | 200 | 300 | 400 | 500 | 600 | 700 | 800 | 900 | 1000 | 1100 | 1200 | 1300 | 1400 | 1500 | 1600 |
| $400 \quad 0.00$ | \$22,000 | \$33,000 | \$44,000 | \$43,000 | \$42,000 | \$41,000 | \$40,000 | \$39,000 | \$38,000 | \$37,000 | \$36,000 | \$35,000 | \$34,000 | \$33,000 | \$32,000 |
| $500 \quad 0.04$ | \$22,000 | \$33,000 | \$44,000 | \$55,000 | \$54,000 | \$53,000 | \$52,000 | \$51,000 | \$50,000 | \$49,000 | \$48,000 | \$47,000 | \$46,000 | \$45,000 | \$44,000 |
| $600 \quad 0.10$ | \$22,000 | \$33,000 | \$44,000 | \$55,000 | \$66,000 | \$65,000 | \$64,000 | \$63,000 | \$62,000 | \$61,000 | \$60,000 | \$59,000 | \$58,000 | \$57,000 | \$56,000 |
| $700 \quad 0.21$ | \$22,000 | \$33,000 | \$44,000 | \$55,000 | \$66,000 | \$77,000 | \$76,000 | \$75,000 | \$74,000 | \$73,000 | \$72,000 | \$71,000 | \$70,000 | \$69,000 | \$68,000 |
| $800 \quad 0.29$ | \$22,000 | \$33,000 | \$44,000 | \$55,000 | \$66,000 | \$77,000 | \$88,000 | \$87,000 | \$86,000 | \$85,000 | \$84,000 | \$83,000 | \$82,000 | \$81,000 | \$80,000 |
| $900 \quad 0.19$ | \$22,000 | \$33,000 | \$44,000 | \$55,000 | \$66,000 | \$77,000 | \$88,000 | \$99,000 | \$98,000 | \$97,000 | \$96,000 | \$95,000 | \$94,000 | \$93,000 | \$92,000 |
| 1,000 0.10 | \$22,000 | \$33,000 | \$44,000 | \$55,000 | \$66,000 | \$77,000 | \$88,000 | \$99,000 | \$110,000 | \$109,000 | \$108,000 | \$107,000 | \$106,000 | \$105,000 | \$104,000 |
| 1,100 0.06 | \$22,000 | \$33,000 | \$44,000 | \$55,000 | \$66,000 | \$77,000 | \$88,000 | \$99,000 | \$110,000 | \$121,000 | \$120,000 | \$119,000 | \$118,000 | \$117,000 | \$116,000 |
| 1,200 0.02 | \$22,000 | \$33,000 | \$44,000 | \$55,000 | \$66,000 | \$77,000 | \$88,000 | \$99,000 | \$110,000 | \$121,000 | \$132,000 | \$131,000 | \$130,000 | \$129,000 | \$128,000 |
| 1,300 0.00 | \$22,000 | \$33,000 | \$44,000 | \$55,000 | \$66,000 | \$77,000 | \$88,000 | \$99,000 | \$110,000 | \$121,000 | \$132,000 | \$143,000 | \$142,000 | \$141,000 | \$140,000 |
| Expected Profit: | \$22,000 | \$33,000 | \$44,000 | \$55,000 | \$65,538 | \$74,923 | \$81,769 | \$85,154 | \$86,231 | \$86,154 | \$85,385 | \$84,385 | \$83,385 | \$82,385 | \$81,385 |
| Maximum Profit: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | !!! |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total Profit: | \$30,000 | \$45,000 | \$60,000 | \$75,000 | \$89,269 | \$101,712 | \$110,135 | \$113,077 | \$112,365 | \$109,827 | \$106,192 | \$102,192 | \$98,192 | \$94,192 | \$90,192 |

Maximum Profit !!!
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## Expected Profit with Revenue Sharing

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \mathrm{R}=\$ 200 \\
& \mathrm{~W}=\$ 40 \\
& \mathrm{C}=\$ 50 \\
& \mathrm{~S}=\quad \$ 10 \\
& \mathrm{p}=0.40 \\
& \hline
\end{aligned}
$$



## Optimal Revenue Share

Retailer's optimal order: $\quad Q_{R}^{*}=F^{-1}\left(\frac{p R-W}{p R-S}\right)$

Condition for coordination: $\quad Q_{\text {Retailer }}^{*}=Q_{\text {Channel }}^{*}$

$$
\begin{array}{r}
\left(\frac{p R-W}{p / R-S}\right)=\left(\frac{R-C}{R-S}\right) \\
p=W \cdot \frac{(R-S)}{R(C-S)}-\frac{S(R-C)}{R(C-S)}
\end{array}
$$

## Coordination with Rev. Sharing



## Revenue Sharing (Normal Approx)

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \mathrm{R}=\$ 200 \\
& \mathrm{~W}=\$ 40 \\
& \mathrm{C}=\$ 50 \\
& \mathrm{~S}=\$ 10 \\
& \mathrm{p}=0.76 \\
& \hline
\end{aligned}
$$



## Equivalence of Contracts

$\square$ In buyback $\left(W_{B}, B\right)$, The retailer:

- Pays $W_{B}$, for each unit ordered; gets $B$ for each unit unsold
- Same as: pays $W_{B}-B$ for each unit ordered and additional $B$ for each unit sold
$\square$ In revenue sharing $\left(W_{R}, p\right)$, the retailer:
- Pays $W_{R}$ for each unit ordered and an additional (1-p)R for each unit sold
$\square$ The contracts are identical when:
- Retailer payment for order: $W_{R}=W_{B}-B$
- Retailer additional payment: (1-p)R = B

$$
\text { or } p=(R-B) / R
$$

## Real Options

-The retailer buys Q call options at a price w.
$\square$ The supplier makes Q items.
$\square$ Each option can be exercised at a unit price E .

- As demand materializes the retailer can take deliveries for an additional payment of E.
$\square$ No more than Q items can be bought from the supplier


## Real Options

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \mathrm{R}=\$ 200 \\
& \mathrm{~W}=\$ 20 \\
& \mathrm{C}=\$ 50 \\
& \mathrm{~S}=\$ 10 \\
& \mathrm{E}=\$ 60
\end{aligned}
$$


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## Real Options

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \mathrm{R}=\$ 200 \\
& \mathrm{~W}=\$ 20 \\
& \mathrm{C}=\$ 50 \\
& \mathrm{~S}=\$ 10 \\
& \mathrm{E}=\$ 60
\end{aligned}
$$



## Coordination with Real Options

Retailer's optimal order:

$$
\frac{d \Pi_{R}(Q)}{d Q}=0
$$



$$
Q^{*}=F^{-1}\left(\frac{R-E-W}{R-E}\right)
$$

Comparing to a single channel:

$$
Q^{*}=F^{-1}\left(\frac{R-C}{R-S}\right) \quad \square E=-\left(\frac{R-S}{C-S}\right) \cdot W+R
$$

Where: $\quad W \in\left(0, R \cdot \frac{C-S}{R-S}\right)$

## Coordination with Real Options

Option Price and Excercise Price

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## Expected Profits with Options


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## Summary

$\square$ Wholesale contracts give too much risk and not enough expected reward to the retailer
$\square$ To make the retailer order more (and increase the channel's profit) the supplier has to take on part of the risk
$\square$ Risk sharing mechanisms covered include:

- Buybacks; revenue sharing, option contract
$\square$ Other mechanisms
- Quantity-flexibility (refund on a portion of the unsold units)
- Sales-rebate (rebate on unsold units above a threshold)
- There are many other mechanisms
$\square$ Each mechanism can coordinate the channel with various allocations of the profit between the retailer and the supplier.


## Any Questions?



## Yossi Sheffi

