

Ethics, Privacy, etc.

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Treatment of Human Subjects: The Belmont Report

1979

Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the
Protection of Human Subjects of Research

- Balancing (societal) benefits vs. (individual) risks
- History of abuses
 - Nazi “experiments” ⇒ Nuremberg code
 - Tuskegee syphilis study

Nazi Medical Experiments

- Freezing / Hypothermia
- Genetics
- Infectious Diseases
- Interrogation and Torture
- Killing / Genocide
- High Altitude
- Pharmacological
- Sterilization
- Surgery
- Traumatic Injuries



A cold water immersion experiment at [Dachau concentration camp](#) presided over by Professor [Ernst Holzlöhner](#) (left) and Dr. [Sigmund Rascher](#) (right). The subject is wearing an experimental [Luftwaffe](#) garment

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nazi_human_experimentation

Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment

- 1932-1972 experiment to study natural progression of disease
- 399 African-American sharecroppers w/ syphilis
- failed to treat even after penicillin was shown to be an effective treatment in 1940's



Public domain image from Wikimedia Commons.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tuskegee_syphilis_experiment

Practice & Research

- The term “practice” refers to interventions that are designed solely to enhance the well-being of an individual patient or client and that have a reasonable expectation of success.
- The term “research” designates an activity designed to test an hypothesis, permit conclusions to be drawn, and thereby to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge.
- Research and practice may be carried on together when research is designed to evaluate the safety and efficacy of a therapy. ... if there is any element of research in an activity, that activity should undergo review for the protection of human subjects.

Basic Ethical Principles

- Respect for Persons
- Beneficence
- Justice

Respect for Persons

- Each person is an autonomous agent, capable of deliberation about personal goals and of acting under the direction of such deliberation
- Persons with diminished autonomy are entitled to protection: e.g., children, physically or mentally disabled, prisoners.
- Requires *Informed Consent*
 - Adequate information
 - Voluntary participation

(Informed Consent)

- Study involves research, purpose of research, duration, procedures, what is experimental?
- Foreseeable risks and discomforts
- Possible benefits to participants or others
- Alternative procedures that might be beneficial
- How confidentiality will be maintained
- For research involving more than minimal risk, what compensations and treatments may be available, and where to get further information
- Participation is voluntary; no penalty for refusal

Beneficence

- Do no harm
 - one should not injure one person regardless of the benefits that might come to others
 - minimize risk to participants
- Maximize possible benefits
 - to society
 - but, research subjects may not benefit directly
- Some tradeoffs are unavoidable

Justice

- Varied views of equal treatment
 - equal share
 - individual need
 - individual effort
 - societal contribution
 - merit
- Select participants fairly
- Distribute benefits fairly

Enforcement: The Common Rule

- Applies to all US Government funded projects involving human subjects
- Institutional Review Boards (IRB) review and must approve all such proposed research; responsible to protect subjects
 - yearly review of research protocols, informed consent, training of researchers, etc. Criteria of Belmont Report.
 - expedited review for research involving “no more than minimal risk”; consent may be waived
 - exemptions for educational research, food quality research, and retrospective research on public or de-identified data
- IRB’s also responsible for protection of confidentiality
- MIT’s IRB is the Committee on Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects (COUHES)

Privacy vs. privacy



Protecting...


- What?
 - Privacy
 - Individual's desire to limit disclosure of personal information
 - Confidentiality
 - Information sharing in a controlled manner
 - Security
 - Protecting information against accident, disaster, theft, alteration, sabotage, denial of service, ...
- Against what?
 - "Evil hackers"
 - Malicious insiders
 - Stupidity
 - Information Warfare

Privacy

- Right to be let alone; e.g.:
 - snooping on Dan Quayle by J. Rothfeder
 - “outing” of Arthur Ashe (HIV), Henry Hyde (adultery)
 - celebrity medical problems (Tammy Wynette, Nicole Simpson)
- ... applies mostly to known individuals

Privacy in obscurity

- Right to remain unknown



Images by MIT OpenCourseWare.

- Correlation among pervasive databases:
 - census
 - marketing
 - health

Confidentiality

- Use and sharing of information by multiple users at many institutions
- Should be controlled by coherent policy
- Enforced by appropriate technology

- E.g., who may use results of your life insurance physical exam, for what purposes?


Legitimate Concerns

(some may be ameliorated by ACA)

- Difficulty getting insurance
 - “Individual insurers may deny you coverage based on your medical history if it includes:
 - Use of prescription drugs to treat anxiety, depression or a physical condition, including Ativan, Klonopin, Paxil, Prozac, Serzone, Zoloft, Xanax and Wellbutrin.
 - Counseling for anxiety, depression, grief or an eating or sleep disorder. Even if you briefly sought counseling as a way to cope with the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, you could be denied individual health insurance, according to researchers with Georgetown's Health Privacy Project.” (MSN, March 9, 2004)
 - Medical Information Bureau
 - Data on all applicants for private life insurance in past 7 years

Additional Legitimate Concerns

- When employer pays insurance premiums, you may lose your job
 - Self-insured companies
 - Small employers facing “experience rated” policies
- Non-employment discrimination based on health
 - Adoption
 - Politics
- Social stigma



→ flow of patient-identified medical information
 - - - - - flow of non-identifiable medical information

- long term repository, patient-identified data
- short term repository, patient-identified data
- temporary access, patient-identified data
- long term repository, non-patient-identified data
- temporary access, non-patient-identified data

Security

- Integrity of data
 - No unauthorized modifications
 - No “dropped bits”
- Availability
 - Natural disaster
 - Adversary attack
 - Inadequacy of backup, fail-over
- Enforcement of confidentiality policies

De-Identification



Identifiable

- **HIPAA:** Name, address, phone number, fax number, email address, URL, IP address, social security number, medical record n., health plan n., account n., certificate/license n., vehicle id, device id, biometric id, full-face photo, date of birth, zip code, gender, race, profession
 - “any other unique identifying number, characteristic, or code”
 - “actual knowledge that the information could be used ... to identify”
- Patterns of doctor visits, immunizations, etc.
 - identifiable by inference
 - depends on knowledge and abilities of data user
- Small bin sizes lead to identifiability
 - Aggregate data into larger bins
 - dob => age
 - 3 digits of zip code

Sweeney's Cambridge

- 1997 Cambridge, MA voting list on 54,805 voters
 - Name, address, ZIP, birth date, gender, ...
- Combinations that uniquely identify:
 - Birth date (mm/dd/yy) 12%
 - BD + gender 29%
 - BD + 5-digit ZIP 69%
 - BD + 9-digit ZIP 97%
- Unique individuals
 - Kid in a retirement community
 - Black woman resident in Provincetown

Problem of “other information”

- Governor Weld’s data found in Mass “de-identified dataset”
- Dates you visited a health care provider (over a lifetime) are probably unique
- Can be used to re-identify you if someone has both de-identified data and other data that link to identifiers
- Genetics makes this immensely more problematic
 - Think Gattaca

Danger of Re-identification




Figure by Sweeney, Latanya. "Computational disclosure control: A primer on data privacy protection." *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*, 2001.

Protection via generalization




Figure by Sweeney, Latanya. "Computational disclosure control: A primer on data privacy protection." *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*, 2001.

Computational Disclosure Control

- Make sure data cannot be traced back to a set of size $< n$
 - Generalization
 - Suppression of unique combinations
 - Account for leakage from what has been suppressed; e.g., back-calculating from aggregate statistics
- How to estimate “external information”?
- **Every** release becomes more external info.

Methods of Generalization/ Suppression

- Underlying problem (find minimal generalization/suppression to achieve a level of anonymity) is NP-hard (Vinterbo)
- Mainly heuristic search over space of possible generalizations/suppressions
 - Scrub, Datafly, μ -Argus (Netherlands), k-Similar
- Lasko: spectral anonymization
 - Build a model of data that captures the n-th order statistics of the distribution
 - Synthesize “fake” patients from that distribution

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