
### Congressional Voters

17.251

Fall 2004

#### **Turnout**




#### How to Calculate Turnout Pct.

Turnout Pct. = Turnout / VAP


not

- Turnout / Registered
- New measure: Turnout / Voting eligible population


#### Turnout/VEP vs. Turnout/VAP




## Variation in Turnout 1998 & 2000



## Correlation in Turnout 1998 to 2000



# Primary & General Election Turnout, 2000



#### Explaining (Non-)Voting


- Expected value of voting =
  - Benefit the individual receives as a consequence of the election outcome
  - Minus
  - The cost of voting

### Explaining (Non-)Voting

State of the World w/out Citizen's Vote	Net Benefit if Citizen Abstains	Net Benefit if Citizen Votes	Condition under which Citizen Should Vote
D wins by more than 1 vote	B <sup>D</sup> <sub>Citizen</sub>	B <sup>D</sup> <sub>Citizen</sub> − <i>c</i>	Never
D wins by exactly 1 vote	B <sup>D</sup> <sub>Citizen</sub>	B <sup>D</sup> <sub>Citizen</sub> – c	Never
D and R tie	(B <sup>D</sup> <sub>Citizen</sub> + B <sup>R</sup> <sub>Citizen</sub> )/2	B <sup>D</sup> <sub>Citizen</sub> − <i>c</i>	$(B_{\text{Citizen}}^{\text{D}} - B_{\text{Citizen}}^{\text{R}})/2 > c$
R wins by exactly 1 vote	B <sup>R</sup> <sub>Citizen</sub>	(B <sup>D</sup> <sub>Citizen</sub> + B <sup>R</sup> <sub>Citizen</sub> )/2 - c	$(B^{D}_{Citizen} - B^{R}_{Citizen})/2 > c$
R wins by more than 1 vote	B <sup>R</sup> <sub>Citizen</sub>	B <sup>R</sup> <sub>Citizen</sub> – c	Never

#### Salvaging the Calculus

- Candidate differenial
- Costs of voting
- Closeness of election
  - Voter attention
  - GOTV
- Citizen duty




### Who is hurt/helped by turnout

Naïve view: Dems helped by turnout

### Who is hurt/helped by turnout

District view: the "out party"



Campaign intensity

#### Deciding whom to support

- Ideology
  - Downsian logic directly
- Party ID
  - Downsian logic by proxy

## Party and Ideology Distance as Explanatory Factors in 2000 Cong'l Elections

House	Ideology of voter			
Party ID	Lib.	Mod.	Con.	Total
Dem	.86	.81	.70	.81
Ind.	.54	.60	.47	.50
Rep	.29	.33	.16	.18
Total	.78	.67	.32	.51

Source: 2000 ANES

Note: R's not asked ideological placement of House or Senate

candidates

Senate	Ideology of voter			
Party ID	Lib.	Mod.	Con.	Total
Dem	.90	.83	.80	.87
Ind.	.79	.67	.48	.60
Rep	.28	.09	.15	.16
Total	.84	.61	.34	.54

#### Overall voting effect, 2002 House election

Party	Effect of changing from an	0.25
identification	Ind. to a Dem.	(0.02)
Ideology	Effect of changing from a	0.07
	mod. To a lib.	(0.02)
Democratic	Effect of changing from a	0.18
incumbent	open seat race to a Dem. Inc.	(0.02)
Constant		0.54
		(0.02)
R <sup>2</sup>		.49
N		586

#### A Word about Primaries

- Party not a useful cue
- Not much research, but.....
  - Primary voters are different from general election voters
    - Primary voters are more ideologically extreme, but
    - Primary voters are more strategically sophisticated than general election voters

## The Ideological Purity/Electability Tradeoff

