Week 9. Military Intelligence and Counterinsurgency

A. Military Intelligence Overview

-Historical rivalry between DOD and CIA since 1947. ie Korea, Soviet missile threat, Vietnam, etc. Creation of DIA in 1961 as national intelligence organization to rival CIA.

-Impact of Desert Storm. Major use of national intelligence assests to plan and fight conflict. Shortcomings and problems identified.ie data flow, humint assets, bomb damage assessment.

-Solution: Give CIA new mission of Support for Military Operations. Create Deputy Director for Military Support and Office of Military Affairs in CIA. Send liaison officers to each major command. Develop NISTs and COLTs.

-Results. Much better coordination and cooperation.

B. Current Use of National Intelligence

-Role in defense planning and net assessments (long range)

-Role in operations planning (warning and forces NIEs)

-Role in combat support. (real time)

C. New Concerns Develop

-As demands for SMO grow, DOD gets more powerful ie 800 pound gorilla.

-NGA created and put in DOD. NRO budget gets much larger.

-911 adds to mission. Afghanistan and Iraq. New Under secretary of Defense (Intelligence)

-DOD creates stronger Defense Humint and Covert action capability. Special Support Teams. New conflict with CIA.

-Concern arises that too many national assets are supporting military operations and counterterrorism

D. Counterinsurgency Problem

-Counterinsurgency conflicts political controversial. Not "clean" warfare. Insurgents rely on civilian support and refuge. Hard to measure results or success.

-Cold War insurgencies used Maoist model. Countryside surrounds cities. Led to conventional warfare. ie China, Vietnam.

-New Islamic insurgencies more like criminal gangs. Use of terror and intimidation. Led to urban terrorist warfare. Destruction of cities ie Iraq

E. New Intelligence Requirements

-Traditional OB factors difficult to apply. Space surveillance (IMINT & SIGINT) not as useful. Need for close-in intelligence, much like police work.

-OB factors: enemy composition, disposition, strength, tactics and operations, training, logistics, combat effectiveness, technology, leadership, miscellaneous ie ideology, culture, motivation, morale.

-What about enemy intelligence capabilities? Counterintelligence problem, particularly with multinational operations. Just like Vietnam.

-Need to penetrate enemy cells. How to get better Humint? Use of interrogation. Status of terrorists as combatants or protected civilians.

-Problem of intelligence support. What can national agencies offer other than experienced analysts and covert sources.

-Who does big picture strategic analysis of conflict. No Vietnam-like studies done yet. Problem of information collection and flow to higher commands and national agencies. What are measures of success?