## Overview: Game Theory and Competitive Strategy II

- Fun and games with bidding situations
- Games with one play only
- Simultaneous choice
- Someone goes first
- Repeated games
- Threats and commitment
- Entry deterrence


## A Negotiation: The Rules

- Objective: max your own financial position
- 2 people negotiate over the division of $\$ 100$, with offers in units of $\$ 1.00$
- Person A offers B a division. If accepted, the division is made. End of negotiation.
- If B refuses A's offer, the amount drops to \$90, and B proposes a division. Person A can accept or reject. If rejects, both get $\$ 0$.
- Negotiation ends (2 rounds only!)


## Dominant Strategies (An Advertising Decision)

Firm B


## Duopoly From Last Time

Firm 2 (competitor)

|  |  | 15 | 20 | 22.5 | 30 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 15 | 450,450 | 375,500 | 338,506 | 225,450 |
| Firm 15 <br> (you) | 20 | 500,375 | 400,400 | 350,394 | 200,300 |
|  | 22.5 | 506,338 | 394,350 | 338,338 | 125,150 |
|  | 30 | 450,225 | 300,200 | 150,125 | 0,0 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |



## Scheduling a Dinner Party

Pat

| $\underset{\sim}{\leftrightharpoons}$ | Fri. Night | Fri. Night | Sat. Night |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | -10, -10 | 4, 5 |
|  | Sat. Night | 5, 4 | -10, -10 |

## A Legal Dispute (Monetary Payoffs)

Other


## The IRS audit

|  |  | IRS |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\underset{i=1}{I}$ | Cheat | Audit | Don't audit |
|  |  | -2, 2 | 2, 0 |
|  | Don't cheat | 0, -2 | 0, 0 |



## Review of Concepts

- Nash Equilibrium: Each player doing the best he/she can, given what the other is doing.
- Dominant strategy: Player's best choice doesn’t depend on choices of others.
- Maximin Strategy: Choice that maximizes the minimum payoff, avoiding big losses


## The Prisoner’s Dilemma

Prisoner B
Don't Confess

|  | Don't | $-2,-2$ | $-10,-1$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  |  |  |  |
|  | Confess | $-1,-10$ | $-5,-5$ |
| 0.0 |  |  |  |

## The Pricing of Airline Travel

|  | US Air |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | High Price |  | Lower Price |
|  | High Price | 50,50 | $-50,100$ |
|  | Lower Price | $100,-50$ | 0,0 |
|  |  |  |  |

## Commitment and Credibility (Cortez and His Soldiers)

|  | Soldiers |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Stay \& Fight | Go Home |
|  | Stay \& Fight | 10,5 |
| Go Home | $-10,-10$ | $-5,15$ |
|  |  |  |

## Selling Beer on the Beach

- Design Characteristic is Location
- Sunbathers are evenly spread. Will walk to nearest seller



## Extensive Form Games: Sequential Moves



Payoffs = (Incumbent payoff, Entrant payoff)

## Entry Deterrence: Precommitment



Potential Entrant

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { Not Enter } \\
& \text { (100-30, 0) } \\
& =(70,0)
\end{aligned}
$$

Incumbent: Incurs 30 in costs to prepare for intense competition

## Take Away Points

- In strategic situations, think about your competitor's reasoning and incentives. In dynamic situations, this leads to backwards induction.
- Communication can eliminate poor outcomes.
- The prisoner's dilemma is one of the most important strategic situations to understand. Often, the only way out is to change the rules of the game.
- Many strategic moves depend on credibility. Commitment may be key here.


## Preparation for Next Time

## GE-Westinghouse

- Is this (or could this become) an attractive industry?
- If you were in charge of pricing for GE, what policy changes would you recommend?

